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Blood is Thicker than Water: Family Ties  
to Political Power Worldwide 
Farida Jalalzai & Meg Rincker ∗ 
Abstract: »Blut ist dicker als Wasser. Familienbindungen und weltweite politi-
sche Machtbeziehungen«. This article analyzes the relevance of family ties for 
the recruitment of chief executives - presidents or prime ministers - with spe-
cial emphasis on gender. Based on a cross-national data-set examining political 
chief executives from 2000-2017 in five world regions (Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, Asia, Europe, and North America), we test several hypotheses 
and present four main results. First, belonging to a political family (BPF), is an 
advantage to entering national executive positions around the world, for both 
democracies and non-democracies. Among those with a sizeable number of ex-
ecutives in this period, regions range from 9 percent (Africa) to 13 percent 
(Latin America and Europe) of executives BPF. Second, executives’ family ties 
are more powerful (with a previous chief executive) in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America and more direct (with an immediate family member) in Asia and Afri-
ca. Across the globe, women only made up 6% of chief executives in the time 
period. Third, females who manage to become chief executives are more often 
BPF than their male counterparts, particularly in Asia and Latin America. 
Fourth, regardless of region, family ties nearly always originate from men, not 
women. 
Keywords: Family ties, executive, political recruitment, gender, democracy. 
1.  Introduction 
Political power has been contested between and passed down through powerful 
families in hereditary monarchies, but also in stable democracies through popu-
lar elections. While these transfers of power flowed mainly from fathers to 
sons, they have at times included formidable female descendants who also 
drew upon their forbearers’ names, experience, and resources to rule others. In 
the 21st century, Freedom House reports that “of 195 countries assessed, 
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eighty-nine (forty-six percent) were rated Free, fifty-five (twenty-eight percent) 
Partly Free, and fifty-one (twenty-six percent) Not Free” (2016).1 In stark con-
trast with the past, 46% of countries’ leaders come to their positions not by 
inheritance, force or military might, but because their citizenries voted for 
them. Furthermore, suffrage has been expanded so that men and women of all 
levels of education, social class, degrees of land ownership, racial, ethnic and 
religious ties are able to participate in choosing their leaders rather than having 
their leaders foisted upon them. Individuals whose families have never be-
longed to the ruling class just need to convince voters that they possess the 
charisma, organization, and determination to govern. We argue, however, that 
even in democracies, individuals from political families still regularly attain 
executive office, illustrating the continuing relevance of political families for 
the recruitment of presidents and prime ministers in general. Moreover, we 
examine family ties in relation to gender, including whether female executives 
are more likely than their male counterparts to hail from a political family, and 
whether this trend is more pronounced in some regions of the world than oth-
ers.  
This article asks whether families are still an enduring source of political 
power and recruitment worldwide in executive politics. Do surnames like Bush, 
Nehru-Gandhi, Marcos, Clinton, Trudeau, Bhutto and Park continue to play 
important roles in determining who holds national executive office, even in 
countries with free and fair elections? Secondly, we incorporate the literature 
on intersectionality, which leads us to examine whether membership in a politi-
cal family benefits all members of political families equally and in similar 
ways. Many women who have held executive national office have had family 
ties to politics, particularly in Asia (Jalalzai 2008; Jalalzai 2013; Jalalzai 2016; 
Lee and Jalalzai 2017). But this trend could also be influenced by the trajecto-
ries of leadership in these countries, and systems of religious values. Systemat-
ic study of nearly all national executives, their powers and connections to polit-
ical families will shed light on how important family ties are today, and 
whether family ties equally and similarly benefit male and female national 
executives. 
Our analysis focuses on presidents and prime ministers from Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America from 2000-2017. 
Specifically, we collect data on the backgrounds of all leaders in power during 
this time period, including family connections and gender. While we systemati-
cally examine the prevalence of family ties to executive power, we also con-
tribute to the theoretical development of the family ties concept. We begin, 
however, with an overview of the importance of family connections to political 
power.  
                                                             
1  <https://freedomhouse.forg/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2015#.Vt1rEzbSlPY>. 
Freedom in the World 2015.  
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2.   Benefits of Belonging 
Why is membership in a family with political power an asset rather than a 
liability? Belonging to a political family (BPF) confers many possible benefits 
(see Figure 1). BPF provides political socialization and a free apprenticeship in 
political strategy, often from a young age. Particularly if his or her relative has 
held political office for a long time (see Bó et al. 2009) this power may become 
self-perpetuating, as a relative seeks to find a successor to inherit accrued polit-
ical resources, or a patsy to carry out his or her will through retirement age. An 
eligible person belonging to a political family can capitalize on name brand 
recognition (Feinstein 2010), trust from voters, greater attention and coverage 
from the media, as well as pre-existing networks and organizations to get out or 
even buy votes (Derichs, Fleschenberg, and Hüstebeck 2006; Hinojosa 2012, 
119-20; Cruz et al. 2015a; Cruz et al. 2015b).2 Although in some electoral 
situations being a candidate with outsider status may help, during a major eco-
nomic crisis, gridlock, or corruption scandal, candidates still have to overcome 
the name recognition problem, so generally a famous outsider is better situated 
to win national political executive office (i.e. Donald Trump) than a “no-name” 
outsider. 
What is the relationship between BPF and political engagement? In general, 
family attitudes have a strong effect on an individual’s political engagement, 
either encouraging or discouraging it. This is because families, a key site of 
discussion about politics, combine with friend and local networks to form the 
social basis of an individual’s attitudes about the political system and foster 
political engagement (McClurg 2003). Ljunge (2015) finds that, across 83 
countries, strong family ties are associated with civic virtues like not cheating 
on taxes or claiming extra benefits.3  
In Figure 1 we assume that the potential effects of BPF could be mediated 
by an individual’s gender identity. Studies of political socialization and gender 
show that the extent to which parents talk or do not talk to their daughters 
about politics affects a girl’s likelihood of saying that she would consider run-
ning for political office in the future (Campbell and Wolbrecht 2006). Actors in 
the political system can also be impacted by the gender of the eligible candi-
date. Voters may be more likely to discount female candidates from political 
families, particularly if their values are that women cannot be effective leaders. 
                                                             
2  We do not imply that family connections will always benefit candidates; this depends on 
myriad contextual factors including whether voters are critical of mainstream politics since 
political dynasties could be viewed as unearned advantages that keep the same types of 
elites in power.  
3  Of course, this is data is from only one empirical study and might require further study. 
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The media and other political elites may also react differently to a male eligible 
BPF than a female eligible. This leads us to Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 1: BPF is an advantage to entering national executive positions 
around the world, in both democracies and non-democracies. 
Figure 1: Benefits of Belonging 
 Political Actors  Potential Benefits of BFP 
  
Individual 
 Training in public 
speaking, strategy, 
interaction, fundrais-
ing, ‘free’ apprentice-
ship 
 
 
Belonging to a 
political family 
 
 
Voters 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name recognition, 
generalized trust 
 Media  Campaign organiza-
tion and turnout 
 Other  Alliances with other 
political elites 
 
We view family very broadly to entail both immediate and extended relation-
ships whether by blood or marriage. However, we view closer relationships to 
power to be held between immediate family (parents/children; siblings; spous-
es; grandparents/grandchildren) rather than the extended family (cousins; un-
cles/nephews). We also consider cases where a leader has multiple relatives in 
politics, especially from their immediate family, as being particularly relevant 
to their political careers; this family is especially entrenched in the political 
system, affording individuals leverage in gaining power.  
We consider power offered by the position the relative held as well, with 
higher levels of office (presidencies and prime ministers) providing more bene-
fits than medium level (parliamentarian and cabinet ministers) and lower level 
posts (state or local official, political activist). We argue that the clearest bene-
fits of family linkages occur between closer relations (immediate family) that 
have held the highest offices. 
Since families tend to play a larger role within cultural settings in which tra-
ditional family structures still dominate as opposed to the more individualistic 
framework of modern (post)industrial societies, we do expect that BPF will be 
even more prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa (Brossier and Gilles 2016), Asia 
Gender 
identity 
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(Derichs, Fleschenberg, and Hüstebeck 2006) and Latin America (Alcántara, 
Barrigan, and Sanchez 2018). This leads us to Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: Family ties in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
will be of a more direct and powerful type, when assessing the type of fami-
ly relationship and the office their relatives held.  
3.   Gender and Family Ties  
The 1990s were a watershed decade in terms of women’s advancement into 
national executive office. The number of new women leaders nearly quadru-
pled in the 1990s and did so again in the 2000s (Jalalzai 2013). Well over 100 
women now have served in these positions, with the majority in prime minis-
terships as opposed to presidencies (Alexander and Jalalzai 2018). 
Women are more likely to emerge in dual executive systems which feature 
both a president and prime minister (Jalalzai 2008, 2013). Women also tend to 
become executives in countries with a higher proportion of women in parlia-
ment. To overcome potential gender bias, females may use their credibility by 
association, running if they have not just the interest but also belong to a politi-
cal family. Together, extant research suggests that women from political fami-
lies are best positioned to leverage family connections to politics and name 
recognition to gain high-status executive office (Jalalzai 2013; Thompson 
2002). Crisis situations such as corruption scandals (Campus 2013, 44) or 
assassination of a male executive in particular appear to change the frames 
through which women’s candidacies are viewed. Party elites and the electorate 
focus less on the qualifications of the candidate which are often gendered (see 
Murray 2010; Rincker 2017; Rincker, Aslam, and Isani 2017), and instead 
focus on a female national executive’s increased status as a mourner and or 
family representative with transferred credibility, and on a women’s ability to 
persevere through hard times. This leads us to Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3: Globally, reflecting higher hurdles for women to enter execu-
tive office, a higher percentage of women executives than their male coun-
terparts are BPF. 
We are interested in examining the types of gendered differences in relation-
ships that are helpful to forging a political career. This expectation derives 
from men’s sheer dominance in holding executive office overall, but this is 
particularly acute where politics is almost exclusively a male domain because 
of various cultural obstacles women still encounter in trying to gain office. As 
such, it might be difficult for them to be the first one in their families choosing 
a political career. Instead, we expect men to be the initial office holder who use 
their influence to occasionally benefit their relatives, some of whom are fe-
male. Women may, however, be able to extend such family connections to 
other relatives in the future. This leads us to Hypothesis 4.  
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Hypothesis 4: Family ties will disproportionately originate from men, not 
women. This is in spite of the increasing number of women in executive po-
sitions over time.  
4.   Research Design 
Before moving forward, we need to consider the definition of familial ties 
which must distinguish between political positions and relationships, as well as 
between various levels of these. Someone is counted as BPF when they are an 
executive possessing a blood or marital connection to someone who holds (or 
held) a formal political office defined very broadly. This would encompass any 
number of national and subnational positions within various institutions includ-
ing political parties and councils. For example, we included not only members 
of the national or subnational cabinets and legislature but also judges, party 
officials, and government bureaucrats. The quality of positions varies to be 
most inclusive of activity ranging from presidents or prime ministers to munic-
ipal officials and local council members (regardless of the size of the council). 
We also count political activists, whether engaged in larger political move-
ments or individual activities. While it might make sense to limit analysis to 
formal political office holders, or even just other prime ministers or presidents, 
power is exercised in many different ways. It has been a struggle to achieve 
democracy in some countries. People engage in political activism to unsettle 
authoritarian regimes and this sometimes results in these actors’ imprisonments 
or even assassinations. As a result, we include family members who served in 
oppositional/dissident political roles. While we must recognize that this outsid-
er position may offer less political capital to a relative than if they held a for-
mal office such as the presidency, the type of support a family member gener-
ates may be particularly strong when the general public is pushing for the 
dismantlement of an authoritarian government.4 
We include all autonomous countries in five major regions – Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and North America5 and our unit of anal-
ysis are the national chief executives, either presidents or prime ministers or 
holders of equivalent positions such as the German chancellor, who is essen-
                                                             
4  In much of the developing world, the military exerts a high degree of authority. Therefore, 
we would want to identify situations where executives have relatives that occupy high lev-
els of military power when the military plays a consequential role in politics as it does in 
some African countries. At the same time, we may not consider this a political role in other 
areas. We start at the rank of colonel and count these as political positions if they are in 
Latin America, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.  
5  We include Mexico in Latin America. We note that we do not include the Middle East and 
North Africa region and discuss the implications of this later in the article. 
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tially a prime minister.6 Our sample includes elected and appointed presidents 
and prime ministers, regardless of whether they came to power through demo-
cratic or undemocratic means. Our time frame is 2000 through the end of Octo-
ber 2017, which allows us to leverage the number of cases of women in office. 
In fact, over half of all women executives to date were in office during this 
period.  
Zarate’s Political Collections lists all of the world leaders throughout this 
period and also includes biographies in Spanish, though not for all cases. We 
supplement this source with additional biographies from news media websites 
including the BBC News and online biographical resources.7 We separated 
individual cases of leaders so that each would only be counted once, even if he 
or she held the same office multiple times but non-consecutively or occupied 
the office of prime minister or president at different times. This yielded a total 
of 1,029 individual cases of executives. We do not only analyze democracies, 
mainly because we expect family connections to exert even more of an influ-
ence in non-democracies and these systems are more common within less de-
veloped regions. 
Table 1: Executive Office Holders by Region 
Region Number (%) Office holders  with family ties 
Percent office hold-
ers with family ties 
Europe       417 (41) 54 13 
Sub-Saharan Africa 312 (30) 29 9 
Asia 204  (20) 23 11 
Latin America 88    (9) 11 13 
North America 8    (0) 2 25 
Total 1029 (100) 119 12 
 
Table 1 lists the number of cases by region. We see that Europe makes up the 
greatest number of cases of executives overall, followed by Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca, Asia, Latin America and North America. More central to our analysis, we 
find that 119 of 1029 leaders are BPF, approximately 12% of the overall total 
as can be seen in Table 1.8 While perhaps lower than in ancient times, family 
                                                             
6  In presidential systems we included the president, in parliamentary systems we examined 
the often indirectly elected presidents (if applicable) and the prime minister, in semi-
presidential systems with directly elected presidents the incumbents of both offices. 
7  If media biographies did not exist, we utilized websites such as Wikipedia that were based 
on biographical sources including news media reports.  
8  We believe that our count of family relationships is probably underestimating its occurrence 
mainly because we have to rely on existing biographies that may not mention these con-
nections. This is due to the fact that there is little detailed biographical information availa-
ble even on national chief executives in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. Further, while con-
nections to other executives such as former presidents and prime ministers might be noted, 
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ties are hardly insignificant in 21st century politics, and thus we show the con-
tinued relevance of family ties for ascent into positions of executive power. 
Our analysis does not include the Middle East and North Africa, so our esti-
mate of the prevalence of family ties is conservative. Conservatively speaking, 
one in ten executives around the world is BPF. We therefore offer confirmation 
of Hypothesis 1: BPF is an advantage to entering national executive positions 
around the world.  
But are family ties only relevant in non-democracies? To assess the implica-
tions of family ties on politics worldwide, it is important to investigate whether 
or not they are associated with a non-democratic, top-down process of choosing 
an executive through elite nepotism and grooming. We therefore examined 
whether family ties are more or less prevalent in electoral democracies by 
integrating data from Freedom House. Freedom House notes that “electoral 
democracy” differs from “liberal democracy” in that the latter also implies the 
presence of a substantial array of civil liberties. Because we are focusing on 
patterns of elite recruitment for elections rather than individual civil liberties 
across a society, the appropriate litmus test is whether countries meet Freedom 
House’s basic standards for an electoral democracy that we describe below.  
We used Freedom House Electoral Democracies dataset, 1988-2017, in 
which “Yes indicates that the country was considered to be an electoral democ-
racy for the year; No indicates that a country was not.” Freedom House 
“[a]ssign[s] the designation ‘electoral democracy’ to countries that have met 
four minimum standards:” a competitive multiparty system, universal adult 
suffrage for non-criminal offenders, regular elections free of fraud and repre-
sentative of the public will, and access of all major parties to the media and 
campaigning. All electoral democracies must have scored twenty out of forty 
on political rights overall, and seven of twelve on the political rights subcatego-
ry A. Further, “[a] country cannot be an electoral democracy if significant 
authority for national decisions resides in the hands of an unelected power, 
whether a monarch or a foreign international authority;” if either presidential or 
parliamentary elections failed to meet the four criteria above, or if legal chang-
es have reduced the possibility of a fair election the country. Because some 
executives served across many years, and countries vary over time in their 
status as an electoral democracy, we note these data in a separate table. In our 
analysis, if there was a year within an individual’s executive time of service 
that Freedom House coded the country as “No,” we erred on the side of catego-
rizing that individual’s term as non-democratic.  
Since our findings are relevant to discussing regional differences, we outline 
the democratic patterns we detected regarding democracy and family ties in the 
next section. Furthermore, we assess interesting regional patterns that position 
                                                                                                                                
it is probably less likely that we would know if they had a distant relative in other political 
offices including national legislative roles or local politics. 
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some areas as more reliant on the family path than others. We also track the 
number of executives from political families from individual countries. Keep-
ing in mind that this is only a 17 year snapshot, countries with multiple in-
stances of political family members in office seem particularly striking. This 
pattern signals the possible entrenchment of political families in the process of 
transferring executive power. Beyond quantity, we also examine within regions 
whether powerful family ties (with a previous chief executive) and direct fami-
ly ties (between immediate family members) are more associated with the 
presence of executives BPF. 
5.   Findings 
As reported in Table 1 we find among countries with a sizeable number of 
executives in this period, Europe has the highest proportion of cases in which 
executives are BPF. Family connections are equally prevalent in Latin America 
where 11 of 88 executives (13%) are BPF. The latter result is not particularly 
surprising, considering the important role we see that family plays within Latin 
American society but also politics in particular (see Hinojosa 2012). Only 
Nicaragua had more than one executive from a political family come to power 
during this time period, though. Given that Latin American countries utilize 
presidential systems, all of these leaders exercised dominant influence. Democ-
racy appears quite strong in the region and none of the leaders from political 
families ascended in non-democratic countries during this period of time.  
 More surprising is that Europe has the second highest proportion of cases in 
which executives are BPF. Specifically, we identified 54 family connections 
surfacing among the 417 European cases, representing 13% of European chief 
executives overall. Twenty-five countries in this region have had members of 
political families serve as executive, with the majority (13 of 25) associated 
with at least two different instances of this. In fact, Greece, Ireland, and Spain 
have had four executives with family connections and Bulgaria and Italy five. 
This confirms that the family path is not just relevant in non-democratic coun-
tries. The vast majority of European countries are democratic. Only Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia have been governed by an executive BPF during this 
time frame in periods of non-democracy. When thinking about the type of 
position held by the executives, the majority (32 or 59%) hold substantial pow-
er in the system as dominant prime ministers. In fact, only 11 serve in mainly 
symbolic roles as either weak prime ministers (four) or presidents (seven), and 
the rest are powerful but not dominant.  
Twenty-three of 204 Asian leaders (11%) are from political families. Six 
countries have had one executive BPF, while seven countries have had two and 
one has had three. In nearly all of these cases, (20/23 or 87%), the leader held 
dominant authority in their systems. Again, this is not surprising given the 
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relevance of family within Asian societies. Bhutan, Kazakhstan, Maldives, 
Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thai-
land had family members in power during non-democratic periods. In fact, only 
four of the 14 Asian countries with leaders BPF were democratic.  
 In Africa, only 29 of its 312 leaders have family ties (9%), which is the 
lowest percentage found for any of the regions. Twenty-one different countries 
have seen executives with family connections coming to power during this time 
period, with the vast majority (14 out of 20 or 70%) with one individual and 
five countries with two people (Benin, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, and Somalia) 
while Mali and Madagascar have had three though all held weak powers as 
prime ministers in presidential systems. Overall, just slightly more hold domi-
nant executive authority in their systems (15 of 29 or 52%). Like Asia, African 
countries have greatly struggled in achieving democracy. Angola, Central 
African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius, Somalia and Togo, rep-
resenting almost half of the countries in this region, had leaders BPF in power 
during undemocratic periods.  
Finally, both of the North American countries in our sample, the United 
States and Canada, have been led by executives BPF, with one case each (2 of 
8 or 25%). Given the executive structures in place in these countries, leaders 
held the dominant executive power and arose in democratic contexts.  
Overall, we do not see a clear pattern between democracy and BPF. BPF is 
an advantage to entering national executive positions around the world, even in 
democracies, providing further confirmation of Hypothesis 1. While we might 
have expected family ties to be more salient in the developing world, perhaps 
where politics is dominated by clientelism (Hinojosa 2012), BPF appears very 
relevant also in the developed world. It is also surprising that Africa has the 
lowest percentage of leaders BPF. Perhaps this is due to the fact that this region 
has only recently undergone democratization, which greatly increased the 
numbers of new parties and candidates competing.  
We next examine the types of relationships that exist between executives 
and their relatives. Of particular interest is whether their relatives held influen-
tial positions such as prime ministerships and presidencies. If this is the case, 
the family tie is more powerful. In contrast, where the relative held a less pow-
erful role such as a local legislator, this indicates a weaker family tie.  
In Africa, we see that most relationships exist between executives and rela-
tives that also held executive power themselves – either presidents or prime 
ministers. In Africa, 16 of 29 executives were related to one president and 
another two had connections to prime ministers. In another instance, a leader 
had two different relatives who held the presidency prior. Taken together, 18 of 
29 of executive BPF in Africa were related to either presidents or prime minis-
ters (59%). Another eight executives had relatives that held other formal posi-
tions such as members of parliament, cabinet ministers and a Supreme Court 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  64 
justice. As such, while Africa has the lowest proportion of executives BPF in 
our sample, those that do have powerful family ties.  
Table 2: Family Ties and Positions by Region  
Position of family 
member(s)* 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Asia 
Latin  
America Europe 
North Ameri-
ca 
President 16 (55) 7 (30) 4 (36) 2 (4) 1 (50) 
Prime Minister 2 (7) 7 (30) 0 (0) 4 (7) 1 (50) 
Other office holder 8 (28) 3 (13) 4 (36) 33 (61) 0 (0) 
Other 1 (3) 0 (0) 1 (9) 13 (24) 0 (0) 
Multiple 2 (7) 6 (26) 2 (18) 2 (4) 0 (0) 
Total with  
family ties 29 (100) 23 (100) 11 (100) 54 (100) 2 (100) 
* Positions mentioned in the first column are the positions family members held before the 
President/Prime Minister in our sample came to power. 
 
In Asia, we find a higher proportion of executives BPF with powerful family 
ties as well. Seven of 23 executives were related to presidents and seven were 
related to prime ministers. Of the six with multiple relationships, two had rela-
tives that held chief executive office. Therefore, 16 of 23 executives BPF in 
Asia benefited from powerful family ties, having relatives who were prime 
ministers and/or president (70%). Finally, only three were related to lower level 
officeholders, and, as such, would be of only marginal political influence. BPF 
has a more direct influence on executive office holding in Asia.  
In contrast to Asia and Africa, in Latin America executive family ties were 
less powerful. Only four of the 11 executives (36%) BPF were related to other 
presidents9. The remaining cases had relations that held lower status posts. 
Although Europe has the largest number of executives BPF, the proportion of 
powerful family ties was rather low; only two of 54 were related to presidents 
and another four were related to prime ministers (11% combined). Most often, 
relatives held other positions such as legislators or cabinet ministers. Finally, in 
both of the North American cases family ties were powerful – one related to a 
president and the other a prime minister. 
Based on these results, we provide partial confirmation of Hypothesis 2: 
BPF is less prevalent among executives in Africa, but, when relevant, family 
ties are more direct and powerful, such as being an immediate family member 
of a former president. In Asia, BPF is prevalent, and family ties are more pow-
erful. Finally, BPF is prevalent in Latin America but family ties are less power-
ful. Since democratic patterns vary quite a bit in these regions and within spe-
                                                             
9  Jorge Luis Batlle Ibáñez of Uruguay had three different relatives that held the presidency 
before he did. 
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cific countries, it is quite challenging to make any direct connections between 
democracy and the prevalence of BPF. 
Table 3:  Family Relationships within Regions  
Region Sub-Saha-ran Africa Asia 
Latin 
America Europe 
North 
 America 
Father/Son 14 (48) 5 (22) 4 (36) 30 (56) 2 (100) 
Mother/Son 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (4) 0 (0) 
Father/Daughter 2 (7) 4 (17) 2 (18) 3 (6) 0 (0) 
Husband/Wife 0 (0) 4 (17) 2 (18) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Grandfather/ 
Grandson 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (6) 0 (0) 
Uncle/Nephew 4(14) 0 (0) 1 (9) 6 (11) 0 (0) 
Brothers 2 (7) 3 (13) 0 (0) 4 (7) 0 (0) 
Brother/Sister 0 (0) 1 (4) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Cousins 2 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Brother-in-Laws 0 (0) 2 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Father/ 
Son-in-Law 1 (3) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Multiple 2 (7) 4 (17) 2 (18) 5 (9) 0 (0) 
Other 2 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (2) 0 (0) 
Total 29 (100) 23 (100) 11 (100) 54 (100) 2 (100) 
 
While to this point we have examined linkages between executives BPF and 
how powerful a position the relative held, we now explore specific types of 
family relationships. We argue that some family ties, whether by blood or 
marriage, are more direct than others. These relationships include spouses, 
siblings, parents/children, grandparents/grandchildren while more distant ex-
amples are cousins and uncle/nephews etc. We would expect more direct fami-
ly ties to offer greater benefits.  
 As far as types of family ties in Africa are concerned, BPF consists mostly 
of fathers/son pairings (see Table 3). The only other more common pattern 
includes uncles and nephews while the remaining cases vary but include such 
relationships as cousins and brothers. Only two women in Africa appear to 
have family connections to power and their relationships are less direct, a point 
we dissect more in the next section. BPF in Asia encompasses a large variety of 
relationships, but almost always direct. Seventeen of 23 had one close relation 
and all four with multiple relatives had at least one that was close (91%). In 
Latin America, most relationships were between close family members, most 
often fathers and sons but also fathers and daughters, as well as husbands and 
wives. One of the cases with multiple relatives also was the son of a former 
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president.10 All connections originated through male relatives, not female, a 
point discussed in the next section.  
Among European executives, a majority (56%) were the sons of male politi-
cians and this relationship is even more prominent when you include execu-
tives with multiple relatives in office. Other close relatives include fathers and 
daughters and mothers and sons, though these only account for three and two 
cases, respectively. We also see several male executives whose uncles were in 
politics.  
In the last area we analyzed, North America, both the United States and 
Canada have seen sons of former presidents and prime ministers respectively 
who hold the same positions as their fathers did. With the absolute number of 
cases being so small, however, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions for 
this region. Across different regions, BPF is most frequent and beneficial to 
executives when familial ties are direct.  
We now turn our attention more fully to gender. Though experiencing rec-
ord highs in office during the time frame examined, women account for only 66 
of 1029 executives. They, therefore, represent only six percent of all leaders in 
power during this nearly eighteen year period. We find the largest number of 
female leaders in Europe, followed by Africa, Asia and Latin America and 
North America that has no cases of women executives (see Table 4). 
Table 4:  Executive Office Holder by Region and Gender Worldwide  
Region  Male (%) Female (%) Total 
Europe       385 (92) 32 (8) 417 
Sub-Saharan Africa 296 (95) 16 (5) 312 
Asia 191 (94) 13 (6) 204 
Latin America 83 (94) 5  (6) 88 
North America 8 (100) 0 (0) 8 
Total 963 (94) 66 (6) 1029 
 
In Africa, we see that most relationships exist between executives and relatives 
that also held executive power themselves – either presidents or prime minis-
ters. In Africa, 16 of 29 executives were related to one president and another 
two had connections to prime ministers. In another instance, a leader had two 
different relatives who held the presidency prior. Taken together, 18 of 29 of 
executive BPF in Africa were related to either presidents or prime ministers 
(59%). Another eight executives had relatives that held other formal positions 
such as members of parliament, cabinet ministers and a Supreme Court justice. 
                                                             
10  This includes a leader with multiple relations in politics who were all presidents. Technically, 
he is counted as multiple rather than under president. 
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As such, while Africa has the lowest proportion of executives BPF in our sam-
ple, those that do have powerful family ties.  
Table 5:  Family Ties and Gender by Region  
Region Total Family ties % 
Total 
Men 
Men 
with 
family 
ties 
% Total Women
Women 
with 
family 
ties 
% 
Europe 417 54 8 385 50 13 32 4 13 
Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 312 29 9 296 27 9 16 2 13 
Asia 204 23 9 191 14 7 13 9 69 
Latin 
America 88 11 13 83 7 8 5 4 80 
North 
America   8  2 25 8 2 25 0 0 - 
Total 1029 119 963 100 10 66 19 29 
 
How does gender inform patterns related to BPF? Nineteen of the 66 (29%) 
women executives in our sample possess familial connections to politics while 
100 of 963 (10%) men do. A larger number of men, therefore, benefit from 
kinship connections. Since women form such a small number of executives, 
however, this translates into a disproportionately high percentage with family 
ties, thus confirming hypothesis 3. 
Women and men do not equally benefit from familial connections to politics 
in all locations worldwide, however. Whereas Europe leads the globe in both 
numbers and percentages of executives from political families, men’s and 
women’s rates of BPF are identical. Women from political families dispropor-
tionately arise only in Latin America, Asia and Africa. Specifically, four of five 
women executives in Latin America possess family ties (80%) compared to 
only seven of 83 male executives (8%). Family ties exist for nine of 13 (69%) 
women leaders in Asia while only 14 of 191 men have ties (7%). In Africa, a 
higher percentage of female than male BPF presents to us just how the hurdles 
are for women to exercise executive power. Of 312 executives in Sub-Saharan 
Africa from 2000-2017, only 16 (5%) were women and 296 (95%) were male. 
Of those 16 female African executives, 2 (13%) were BPF. Contrast this with 
296 males who were executives in Africa, and 27 (9%) were BPF. A lower 
percentage of male executives were BPF, but even with family connections 
there were only 16 women executives in this period. Men for the most part do 
not need to be BPF but can still exercise 94% of executive power, while wom-
en only governed in 6% of cases, and then in 29% of these cases BPF was a 
factor. In essence 94-10= 84% of time a male who isn’t BPF governs. Six 
percent of cases a woman governs, and moreover, 29% of this time family 
connections play a role. It’s miniscule when women govern as chief executives, 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  68 
and when they do it without a family tie where male authorization often plays a 
role.  
We are also interested in whether women ever were responsible for the fam-
ily’s initial foray into politics. The two cases in Europe where we saw male 
executives having female political relatives, neither of these were prime minis-
ters and presidents. Given that no executives in Latin America, North America, 
and Africa had family ties to women in politics, we confirm hypothesis 4 that 
family ties usually originate from men, not women.  
In Europe, in two cases female relatives (mothers) held office first. Neither 
was a prime minister or president. In Africa, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of 
Liberia’s father served in parliament and Acting President of Mauritius 
Monique Ohsan-Bellepeau’s father founded a political party. Neither, there-
fore, enjoyed the same close family relationships that men do to presidents in 
this region. Another point worth noting is that wives do not follow their hus-
bands into executive office in Africa; this tendency to follow male relatives 
into executive office is relegated to male heirs in Africa (at least through 2017). 
As such, even though a slightly higher percent of women were coded as pos-
sessing family ties than men in Africa, we notice that BPF does not afford the 
highest advantages for women. These links did not directly propel them to 
power while their male counterparts regularly benefitted from being their fa-
thers’ heirs apparent. In Africa, very few women executives come to power 
and, when they are BPF, they are not the relatives of former chief executives. 
Here, the maleness of executive office may be so entrenched that even family 
linkages do not allow women to surmount barriers to ascend to power. The 
obstacles women face in achieving the presidency in Africa are multiple. These 
include presidential systems providing chief executives with a multitude of 
powers and path to office through popular vote, conditions under which women 
seldom come out victorious (Jalalzai 2013). We also note that in many African 
countries including Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea, the presidents have held 
onto to power for so long (40 and 36 years respectively) that it has been virtual-
ly impossible for anyone to gain access to the presidency. As we have not yet 
incorporated the regions of Northern Africa and the Middle East, we are per-
haps even underestimating the maleness of the executive overall, and men from 
political families particularly.  
Notably, some women initially appear to pass on political connections to 
both male and female relatives in Asia. Once we dig deeper, however, the 
original connection actually started with a male relative. In Pakistan, Asif Za-
dari served as president after his wife, Benazir Bhutto, had been killed while 
campaigning for a third term as prime minister. Yet, Bhutto herself was the 
daughter of the slain former president and prime minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
(thereby Zadari’s deceased father in law). “Noynoy” Aquino, former President 
of the Philippines, was the son of President Corazon Aquino. Again, however, 
we see that it was his father, Benigno Aquino, who set this line of leadership in 
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motion.11 In Sri Lanka, Chandrika Kumaratunga was the daughter of Prime 
Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Again, however, her mother’s source of pow-
er was that her husband, Solomon Bandaranaike, who had served as prime 
minister before his assassination.12  
6.   Discussion  
In this article, we have examined the frequency and importance of belonging to 
a political family (BPF) to holding national chief executive office in the 21st 
century. We presented four main findings. First, belonging to a political family 
(BPF) is an advantage to entering national executive positions around the 
world, for both democracies and non-democracies. Regions range from 9% 
(Africa) to 13% (Latin America and Europe) of executives BPF. Second, family 
ties are more powerful (with a previous chief executive) in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America and more direct (with an immediate family member) in Asia and 
Africa. Third, females who manage to become chief executives are more often 
BPF than their male counterparts, particularly in Latin America and Asia. 
Across the globe, women only made up 6% of chief executives in the time 
period. For some women, BPF is a key reason they are able to surmount tradi-
tional obstacles women face in gaining access to power. While men also bene-
fit from such connections, they are more likely to ascend to executive office, 
and so less frequently need to be BPF. Fourth, regardless of region, family ties 
nearly always originate from men, not women. Women tend not to be the first 
member of their families to hold a national chief executive office, though they 
may extend the family path to power to future generations. In the few cases in 
Asia where males followed their female relatives to executive posts, the origi-
nal tie to power emanated from a male relative. In Europe, when two women 
initiated the political family path, they held less prominent political positions 
rather than presidencies or prime ministerships. 
Patterns around family ties in executive politics are shaped by the sheer 
dearth of women executives. Though their numbers indeed are growing, wom-
en continue to be vastly underrepresented in executive office. To remedy this, 
more women need to be able to rise to power – without the requirement that 
                                                             
11  Benigno Aquino was a political activist and de facto opposition leader jailed on subversion 
charges. After returning from exile, he was set to defeat the Marcos regime but was assassi-
nated ahead of the 1983 elections. Without this connection, his wife would never have 
gained the presidency (Brooke 2002; Jalalzai 2013; Thompson 2002) in the first place. 
12  These three Asian cases are counted as having multiple relatives in our analysis. We also 
point out that Kumaratunga used her presidential powers to appoint her mother to her last 
term prime ministerial term demonstrating the complexity in advantages among political 
relatives.   
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they belong to an important political family. This leads to an important point 
regarding the interpretation of these results. Given the very small numbers of 
women leaders in this analysis overall, any slight changes in results affect 
interpretations drastically. We also note that not all political relatives are allies. 
Instead, some are political rivals, using their powers to oust their own relatives 
from executive power.13 The complexities of family connections, therefore, 
need to further be problematized particularly in viewing kinship as an ad-
vantage versus a liability. We also assert that women’s stronger dependency on 
family ties to power, though still critical, seems to be waning at least in Latin 
America. This trend seems to be less pronounced in Asia though, though Tai-
wan’s President Tsai Ing-wen provides a counter-example. Finally, it is obvi-
ous that the overall rather modest importance of family ties for ascent into 
highest executive office in democracies as well as non-democracies.  
As far as moving the research agenda on this topic forward, we are currently 
collecting data on prior political experience (including political activism), 
educational training (degree but also if they obtained their educations outside 
of their home regions), marital status, whether they have children, age they first 
entered executive office, path to power and political party. We hope to see not 
only how family ties affect these variables but how gender interacts with these 
conditions. Family ties seem to be an additional asset for a career (as assumed 
in Figure 1), but neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for achieving 
high political office. To confirm this, however, more data on personal back-
grounds and on executive candidacies would be needed. It would also be bene-
ficial to analyze how BPF shapes access to other political offices besides na-
tional chief executives.  
We do not only plan to include regions missing in the present analysis, but 
also to expand the time frame backwards to the starting year 1990. That would 
provide us a bigger window to assess changes in the relevance of family ties 
over time but also leverage the cases of women in power, which was still much 
lower until the 1980s. We might expect that family ties proved even more 
salient in the past, but can only analyze this in a limited way at this point. De-
spite a global shift to expanded suffrage, family ties remain a significant path to 
executive office, across both democratic and non-democratic countries. Re-
gional variance notwithstanding, belonging to a political family is resource 
                                                             
13  At times, presidents were handpicked successors of their relatives such as Ismaïl Omar 
Guelleh whose uncle, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, selected him as his replacement after over 20 
years of holding power Djibouti. While we see the coordination of executive power transfer 
between relatives, in some instances we see competition between relations. For example 
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo ousted his uncle Francisco Macías Nguema, from the 
Equatorial Guinea presidency in a military coup. In Thailand, Somchai Wongsawat deposed 
his brother in law, Thaksin Shinawatra, in a coup. 
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more often drawn upon by women and perhaps someday will be a resource 
female executives can originate and hand down to relatives.  
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